1 2	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION	
3	AL WILLIAMS,	) Docket No. 08 C 6409
	·	j ,
4	Plaintif	) June 7, 2011
5	V .	) 9:21 a.m. )
6	CITY OF CHICAGO, and CH POLICE OFFICERS Z. RUBA	
7	#14540, B. CORCORAN, Star #8261, ) S. LECK, Star #2752, B. GENTZLE, )	
8	Star #8738, T. JAROS, Star ) #10428, and UNKNOWN CHICAGO )	
9	POLICE OFFICERS,	
10	Defendants. )	
11	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS - Motion BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOAN H. LEFKOW	
12	APPEARANCES:	E HONOROBEE GOAN III. EEL NOW
13		
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(In open court:)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: 08 C 6409, Williams v. City of Chicago.

MR. KOSOGLAD: Good morning, your Honor. Jared Kosoglad and Brendan Shiller for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. JONES: Good morning, your Honor. Walter Jones, Jr., and Jorge Cazares on behalf of the City.

MR. CAZARES: Good morning, Judge.

MR. SHILLER: Good morning.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we have here issue that calls -- I think I told you on the -- before that the motion for new trial was denied, but I don't think it ended up on the -- on the record. Maybe I didn't.

So but it comes down to the issue -- I don't -- I don't think there's any basis for a new trial. It comes down to the issue of remittitur, and you've filed cases on both sides of the issue. And it seems to me something of a matter of discretion whether -- you know, a judgment call: Does this shock the conscience?

Certainly \$100,000 is rarely very shocking. It's somewhat large for what happened to him. And then the jury verdict was a little curious because while it wasn't an inconsistent verdict, it seemed sort of counterintuitive, shall we say. But jury verdicts are often that way, I must say.

So this man didn't have any medical care, and he 1 2 doesn't get any damages for being held in custody for a period 3 of time -- which was what? How long was that? I was trying to remember. 4 MR. SHILLER: 40 days, your Honor. 5 6 THE COURT: 20? 7 MR. SHILLER: 40 days. 8 THE COURT: 40 days. 9 MR. SHILLER: Does your Honor want to hear any 10 argument? 11 THE COURT: Pardon me? 12 MR. SHILLER: Does your Honor want to hear any 13 argument? 14 THE COURT: Sure, I can hear you. Whose motion is it? 15 It's Defendants' motion. 16 MR. CAZARES: It's our motion, Judge. 17 MR. JONES: It's our motion, Judge. 18 THE COURT: I'll hear from you first. 19 MR. JONES: Judge, you know, you were very attentive 20 during the course of this trial. And one of the things that is 21 so clear here is that -- that what this is based upon was the 22 abrasion on his forehead, that he never had one stitch, never 23 received one parcel of treatment. No treatment at all. He 24 never even got Mercurochrome on this thing. He never -- he 25 never sought out any treatment of his own.

And this \$100,000 for -- for this claim, no matter how you look at this, this is -- and the jury -- when you take a look at everything that went on, that of all the counts, no malicious prosecution, no conspiracy, no intervention, none of that. And it comes down to the single claim where he didn't even get Mercurochrome on his head.

Judge, this is excessive. There is something -- this is in your discretion, and we're just -- we think that we're entitled to some relief here.

THE COURT: Mr. Shiller.

MR. SHILLER: Thank you, your Honor.

I think there's three points. The first is what the transcripts don't show is the character and quality of the pictures which the jury viewed in person, the character and complexion of the testimony and whatever fear and emotional anger that -- that the plaintiff felt at the time of this incident and how he described it, which the jury heard in person. That's the first part. That's -- that's not what's in the transcripts.

The second thing is no matter how much Defendants wanted to say it's just this one injury, it was multiple injuries; it was multiple actions over a period of time. There was a bruise to the shoulder introduced; the jury must have believed that. Otherwise, they wouldn't have had this judgment. There was a bruise to the elbow introduced; the jury

must have believed that. There was testimony of a punch to the groin; the jury must have believed that. And there was testimony of punches to the stomach; the jury must have believed that.

And, third, when we look at these other cases, what we see with some of these other cases which were upheld because they were within the discretion, the \$50,000 for the simple assault, there is -- there is a value in the fear and in the anger that comes from being assaulted and battered from a person of authority, and that value is immeasurable. In one case, at least the one case we presented, that value was \$50,000. And that's a separate value from any actual physical damages.

So clearly while \$100,000 is more than is usually granted in these cases, while \$100,000 is higher than any other jury we give, the case law teaches just because we pled our facts better and just because the jury chose to believe our client in all of his testimony, both his physical and emotional damages as it relates to that assault and battery, does not mean you should reduce the damages.

MR. JONES: I would just say one last thing, Judge. You know, one of the things that you know about this case is when we talk about his emotional state, he had been arrested more times than Michelangelo saw ceilings. It's not like this was -- he's been arrested damn near 40 times. It's not like

you look at me and say, well, whoa. Here it is I'm arrested for the very first time in my life.

So when you take a look at all of this, I would say, to end up, we think we're entitled to some relief here.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know if that's a very good argument, Mr. Jones, because I don't know anything about those other arrests or how many times he was convicted or anything. I can only deal with one at a time.

MR. JONES: They were part of our motions, Judge, if you recall.

THE COURT: Yes, but it's -- you know, I have other cases.

I think that to say this verdict was monstrously excessive is -- it's not fair. I mean, we've got the one case with the \$50,000 award for simple assault, and then we have, you know, the case that Judge Holderman -- I think it was Holderman who reduced \$1 million to \$200,000. So, you know, when you get -- if the jury had awarded him \$1 million or \$500,000, I certainly would agree with you that that would be excessive for this case.

But, you know, it took him two years of litiga -three years of litigation to get where he got, and, you know,
you could have settled this for under \$100,000, and you, you
know, refused to talk about settlement in any serious way. And
the jury came in for the plaintiff.

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And I don't think it's monstrous. It's large. It's bigger than usual. But that's what juries do. They assess damages. And I don't really have a basis for intervening other than to, you know, say if I had been the jury, I would have given him \$75,000 or something -- I don't know -- 25,000. Who is going to say? That's what juries do. So motion is denied. Where do we stand on the fee issue? MR. KOSOGLAD: Judge, we're preparing a joint statement pursuant to Local Rule 54.3. And I think it's due Thursday, but we would ask -- we're working on preparing it for an extra -- for -- I guess for a week from today. MR. CAZARES: For a week, yeah. THE COURT: Can you settle it? MR. CAZARES: Well, we met for two hours yesterday, Judge, and, you know, that's an option. It's all I can say right now, that yes, we met for two hours, and we're -- that's

why we're pushing off this joint statement, to see if we can try to do something.

THE COURT: Okav.

MR. SHILLER: We recognize -- and I think your Honor should too -- that this is one of those cases where the City transition probably stalled things out a few weeks.

THE COURT: Oh, right, right.

MR. SHILLER: So we may work towards a settlement.

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THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess you're on a schedule,
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      so I don't need to set a status, right?
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               What about costs? Have they been filed?
               MR. KOSOGLAD: Yes.
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               THE COURT: Assessed? Taxed?
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               MR. SHILLER: Well, they've been filed. You know,
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      we'll -- we don't mind holding off on that. It's part of what
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      we'll try to work out.
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               THE COURT: So you can work it out with the fees
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      issue?
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               MR. JONES: We're trying.
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               MR. CAZARES: We're trying, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. KOSOGLAD:
                              Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Be reasonable, Mr. Shiller.
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               MR. SHILLER: Why are -- why are you singling out me?
               MR. CAZARES: Thank you, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Because I -- I just shaved some off of
19
      your --
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               MR. SHILLER:
                             Okay.
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               MR. JONES: Yeah, you gave them -- they got a little
22
      buff here.
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               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
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          (Adjourned at 9:30 a.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T EI certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ Laura R. Renke June 9, 2011 Laura R. Renke, CSR, RDR, CRR, CLR Date Federal Contract Reporter CSR License No. 084-003184